Eiad Husham is a Sudanese journalist whose investigative reports and insightful analyses have appeared in numerous outlets, including Sudans Post, Ayin, Al Jazeera, The New Humanitarian, Geeska, and more. He obligingly answered my questions about the current state of Sudan’s civil war and about the present situations and future prospects of various factions and forces. The interview plunges into current dynamics; if you need to familiarise yourself with the background, one place to start is Khalid Medani’s 2024 primer for MERIP.
Alex Thurston: Could you tell us about the humanitarian situation in Sudan currently – how do things stand in Darfur, Kordofan, and elsewhere?
Eiad Husham: Sudan is in a full-scale humanitarian catastrophe. Credible estimates now put over 30 million people, roughly two-thirds of the population, in need of urgent humanitarian aid. Famine conditions have been confirmed in multiple regions in Sudan, and most notably in El-Fashir, Darfur, which has been under siege by the RSF for over a year. Aid convoys are blocked, and civilians have resorted to eating animal feed to stay alive. Additionally, Kordofan is also facing an extensive humanitarian disaster, with aid being politicised and blocked by all warring factions in the region, including SAF, the RSF and SPLM-N [for a report on the weaponisation of aid, a report to which Husham contributed, see here – AT].
AT: Do the Sudanese Armed Forces have a path to a decisive military victory? What would need to happen for them to achieve that?
EH: A clean near-term battlefield victory is unlikely in the present conditions. Though SAF have control of Central and Eastern Sudan, and are contesting Kordofan, analysis highlights that the RSF remains deeply entrenched in Darfur and capable of mobilising operations along supply line routes. A decisive SAF victory would require breaking RSF control in Darfur, regaining Kordofan and maintaining sustainable logistical support and supply of arms.
AT: How likely do you think it is that there will be a de facto, long-term partition of the country?
EH: The current reality is that the RSF has declared a government in their controlled areas, and it means that Sudan now has two de facto governments, each controlling certain regions and localities. This means in Sudan there is the possibility of being on the path of yet another partition, similar to that which happened with Sudan and South Sudan. As it stands, it’s unknown if these two de facto governments will hold power or whether there will be a permanent partition. What can be said decisively is that neither party holds real constitutional legitimacy in Sudan.
AT: Beyond Abdel Fattah al-Burhan of the SAF and Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo/Hemedti of the Rapid Support Forces, who are some other key personalities on each side of the civil war?
EH: Sudan’s war is a counter-revolutionary war that is fueled by a multitude of actors, both regional and international, as well as locals, aside from Burhan and Hemedti. The most notable local actors people should be aware of on both sides are Abdel-Rahim Daglo, deputy commander of the RSF and brother to Hemedti, the only Daglo family member seen on the battlefield in Sudan over the past year. He is currently sanctioned by the US for crimes against humanity and war crimes committed in Darfur [see here – AT]. Al Goni Daglo is the younger brother of Hemedti, the HR, PR, business and logistical mastermind of the Daglo empire. He is responsible for the contracting of PR agencies, think tanks and political allies in an effort to obscure RSF’s as well as the Daglo family’s very dark past and present crimes in Darfur and elsewhere.
On the other side, with SAF, Shams al-Din al-Kabbashi, who is the deputy to the commander in chief, is a highly respected commander within SAF with an extensive tactical background. He has been responsible for the political bureau of the Sudanese Armed Forces since the revolution in 2018. Yassir Al Atta is the assistant to the commander-in-chief of the armed forces. Considered by many to be the vocal hardliner of the armed forces, he is often deployed to deliver strong messages to allies and adversaries when needed. Ali Karti is the man responsible for the Islamic Movement within Sudan and is especially influential within SAF. His influence has now been confirmed by many within the Movement as well as sources in SAF itself, noting the existence of Islamists fighting on the ground within SAF, as well as numerous Islamic militias that are ideologically guided by him in this war.
AT: What impact do you think the RSF’s formation of a parallel government will have, within Sudan or internationally?
EH: At this time, within Sudan, there will be effects on civilians stuck in their areas of control. In the event that SAF regains those territories, there is definitely a threat of accusation of collaboration by the army against civilians, who, as it stands, have minimal routes available to exit those territories. On an international scale, although not officially recognised by international actors, they will, without doubt, be present in any stage of negotiation as they control large swathes of the country and represent the RSF politically. There have been reports alleging that there is a connection with former Prime Minister Abdallah Hamdok and his civilian Sumood Coalition and confirmed ties to Kordofan’s SPLM-N.
AT: The RSF appears to be particularly brutal in its treatment of civilians, as you have chronicled in your reporting – what do you think explains that brutality?
EH: The RSFs got their origins as the Janjaweed in the late 90s and early 2000s. Armed and empowered by the al-Bashir regime [in power from 1989-2019], they were used to suppress secessionist rebellions in the western state of Darfur. They were authorised and encouraged to kill, abuse and ruthlessly pursue Sudanese of African origins. Violence is enshrined in the apparatus and has been something that has carried over, after the end of the Darfur genocide, throughout the attempts to suppress the revolution, and it continues today. They are especially brutal towards civilians because they were trained and encouraged to do so.
AT: Reuters recently reported on the possibility of a political comeback for Islamists – who do you think are the most influential civilian politicians in Khartoum at the moment?
EH: The Islamists are without a doubt attempting to make a comeback and re-solidify their influence in the Sudanese political arena. This has been seen through a series of actions starting from after the coup and continuing to the present day. The strongest Islamic figure now is Ali Karti, who is based in Turkey and has been there since the revolution. There is no single most influential civilian politician in Sudan, but I believe that the grassroots movements, civil coordination bodies and resistance committee are the ones who should be empowered to chart the path forward and are realistically the best positioned to do so, as they have taken on a large part of the roles and responsibilities of the state during and even before this war.
Alex Thurston is an associate professor in the School of Public and International Affairs at the University of Cincinnati. He studies Islam and politics in Africa.
*This interview was first published on Alex Thurston’s Substack.
